The evidence continues to mount that Canada is facing both foreign interference and influence threats on the eve of the Alberta referendum and its separatist question. With ballot day on October 19, neither the federal nor provincial governments are doing much to help the public understand what constitutes foreign interference in Canadian electoral processes and how it might affect voters.
The federal government and its intelligence system have the tools to protect against these foreign threats — they just haven’t been deployed. An intelligence centre called the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE TF) exists to monitor foreign interference in elections. But it sits at the federal level — sidelined when it comes to provincial processes like Alberta’s “direct democracy” referendum experiment. This inaction threatens to undermine the very best weapon against foreign interference: public transparency.
We no longer live in a world where simple and secure ballot counting is enough. Without public transparency about the role played by foreign interference, whether great or small, there can be no confidence in the outcome of electoral processes.
Canada is currently navigating a tangle of new laws, the enduring complications of federal-provincial relations, and the hangover of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institution as the Alberta referendum draws near.
On the legal front, the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act mashes two distinct problems into one bill and relies on a definition drawn from the 1984 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to highlight only the aspect of clandestine and deceptive activity — the classic understanding of foreign interference. Against this, there is the legislation that established the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, which targets influence operations, defined as activities that “intend to affect, shape or alter the decisions, actions, opinions or conduct of public office holders or others in relation to Canadian political or governmental processes” (emphasis added by author). Interference is clandestine; influence is open. If only it were that simple.
No bright red line can be drawn between the two. Clandestine activity can hide behind open influence activities — especially when it comes to sources of financial support — and in the operations of bot networks and generative AI to spread ideas. The notion that open influence operations must be treated as benign is naive. It’s the source and the intent that count.
The foreign interference inquiry told an important, measured story in its final report in January 2025 about the impacts of foreign interference on federal elections. But it is unclear how much its message has hit home with Canadians, especially regarding the “existential threat” of disinformation. Many of its recommendations have gone unheeded, including one to ensure that the government “publicize the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect our democratic institutions and processes from foreign interference.”
Instead of information about measures taken and mechanisms in place, we get reassurance and high-minded messages. It’s good, of course, to hear from Prime Minister Mark Carney that Canadians will not follow the siren call of tech gazillionaire Elon Musk for provinces to separate from the Confederation. Good to hear that Canada is closely following allegations of foreign interference in the Alberta referendum campaign. Good to hear from Steven MacKinnon, Government House Leader, that Ottawa is working alongside Alberta provincial authorities “to ensure the integrity of the referendum.”
None of this brings the public any closer to an authoritative picture of interference and influence operations, and their crossovers in the Alberta referendum. Instead, it breeds complacency, which benefits no one. Without an authoritative picture, polarized actors will always have room to sow doubt and confusion. This could ultimately be the greatest damage the Alberta referendum could do to democratic discourse. Those who cast their ballots need to know whether hidden hands — and whose — were at work, especially in the digital information space.
Importantly, the federal government has learned one big lesson when it comes to monitoring interference in federal elections: the need to account for, analyze and publicize what it has discovered. In the last federal election, the SITE TF produced weekly, on-the-record briefings for the media and delivered a post-mortem report on what it had witnessed. Downing tools for the Alberta referendum makes no sense.
Albertans and Canadians deserve a full report on what was learned about foreign interference and influence activities in the Alberta referendum. This should be delivered as soon as possible after the vote count. Ideally, the report should be a joint effort by the provincial and federal governments. It would be in Alberta Premier Danielle Smith’s interest to play along, to demonstrate that the provincial government takes foreign interference threats seriously — even if leaders of the separatist movement do not.
Separatist actors, like the Alberta Prosperity Project, have sought to associate themselves closely with elements of the Trump administration and have tried to leverage its financial and political support. The deadline to register existing arrangements with the Office of the Foreign Influence Commissioner of Canada has passed, and the Alberta Property Project declined to register its previous engagements with US officials with the Foreign Influence registry. But they, like everyone else involved in the Alberta referendum, must be held to account. The only way to do that is to have transparent, authoritative reporting from the federal and provincial governments on foreign interference and influence operations. Reassurance is not enough.
