Ottawa’s Election Security Fix Is Too Little, Too Late

Ottawa's new election security bill checks some boxes from the Hogue inquiry. It leaves many more unchecked.

April 27, 2026
Wark, Wesley - Bill C25 Elections Canada
Many of the changes advanced by the Bill so far are low-hanging fruit. (Ben Nelms/REUTERS)

This article was first published by The Hub.

The Canadian government has just introduced legislation to strengthen election security, some 14 months after the publication of the final report from the foreign interference inquiry. The new legislation, Bill C-25, is titled the Strong and Free Elections Act.

The footprints of some of the key election controversies that featured during the foreign interference inquiry hearings are all over the bill. There are notable efforts to ensure that no foreign entity attempts to manipulate nomination contests — a reference to concerns over the Don Valley North Liberal nomination contest (won by Han Dong) prior to the 2019 federal election — and, more generally, to create stronger guardrails to prevent foreign involvement in election processes, whether through financing (including the use of crypto assets), traditional person-on-person interference or manipulative information operations. Bill C-25 puts into law six recommendations from the foreign interference inquiry: nos. 31, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 49.

The new legislation also responds to concerns expressed in reports from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security about the growing threat of “deep fakes” of all kinds, including visual images, written material and audio representations. Use of deep fakes is criminalized but with one exception, where such representations are “manifestly for the purpose of parody or satire.” It’s good to spare the comics, but the interpretation of the law may prove contentious.

Alongside the legislation, the government promises to boost spending on the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), a small and unique unit housed at Global Affairs Canada (GAC), mandated to identify foreign disinformation campaigns. The RRM will get $31.5 million over five years, a significant increase over previous funding envelopes. This will come as a relief to the GAC data scientists, as RRM funding announced in Budget 2022 ($13.4 million over five years) was coming to an end.

The government announcement on Bill C-25 also referred to a revised Cabinet directive, now called the Coordinated Response to Threats to Elections. It replaces the original Critical Election Incident Public Protocol laid down in 2019, often referred to as the “panel of five.” The basic idea remains the same — to empower an independent body of senior civil servants to come together during the election writ period to study the available intelligence on foreign interference threats and issue public warnings if it deems them necessary (no such warnings were issued in the federal elections in 2019, 2021 and 2025).

The changes include the addition of an individual outside government, to make a panel of six. There are suggestions about how the panel could use or communicate threat information, below the “nuclear option” of generating a nationwide public warning about foreign interference attempts. The directive also confirms the practice, adopted after the 2025 federal election, of issuing a public after-action report. Unwisely, the new directive drops the requirement for an independent review — just when it might be needed most.

Where does the combination of proposed new legislation to strengthen election security, and promised action, leave us with respect to the totality of Justice Marie-Josée Hogue’s 51 recommendations? The commissioner urged early adoption of a whole raft of them — 24 in total.

How many has the government actually taken steps to bring about? Only eight. Revising legislation and introducing new policies are always complex, but many of the changes advanced so far are low-hanging fruit.

What’s missing on the urgent to-do list? Some key pieces include building an open-source intelligence agency and ensuring better use of open-source information; providing a public mandate for the national security and intelligence advisor; publishing a foreign interference strategy; developing a public communications strategy on responses to foreign interference; and reforming the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force.

Bill C-25 and its associated government announcements offer a package of responsible changes, but they are far from a full response to the recommendations of the foreign interference inquiry. The government should deliver that full response in short order.

The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.

About the Author

Wesley Wark is a CIGI senior fellow.