During a recent trip to Taiwan — where I met with government officials, policy makers, university professors and private-sector representatives — the word “uncertainty” was at the heart of many conversations. China’s military modernization, economic coercion and increasingly assertive, if not aggressive, attitude are reshaping the regional security environment. In today’s geopolitical environment, competition over semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and other critical technologies is blurring the line between economic and national security. Meanwhile, questions about the future role and reliability of the United States are forcing countries across the region, much as in Canada, to reconsider old assumptions.
How should a middle power such as Canada navigate an increasingly contested and unpredictable international environment? Facing threats from Russia, China, Iran and even the United States, Canada is beginning to confront some of the strategic dilemmas that Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have navigated for years. While these East Asian countries face much more immediate security challenges than Canada, their experiences offer important lessons for a country confronting economic coercion, foreign interference from multiple actors and growing uncertainty about the international order.
Economic Security as a Pillar of National Security
Semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, telecommunications infrastructure and supply chains have become instruments of geopolitical power, and Taiwan is a prime example of this trend. The island sits at the centre of the global semiconductor industry, producing more than 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors and over 90 percent of its most advanced chips.
Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te recently linked the island’s semiconductor strength to its democratic system, arguing that democracy and the rule of law have helped Taiwan become a reliable and trusted supplier of advanced technology.
Since 2020, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau has examined 166 cases involving allegedly illegal Chinese operations and talent poaching in the technology sector. A more serious disruption to that industry, such as a direct invasion, would send shocks throughout the global economy, affecting everything from automobiles and smartphones to AI and defence systems. The ongoing blockage of the Strait of Hormuz would pale in comparison.
This technological strength gives Taiwan enormous strategic importance, but it also creates great vulnerability. For several decades, Taipei has been forced to think about economic resilience in terms of trade, industrial policy and national security. For example, in 2022, Taiwan strengthened its economic-security legislation, amending the Cross-Strait and National Security Acts to introduce tougher protections for designated “critical technologies.”
Canada can do the same to protect its own economic industry. Critical minerals, energy, AI expertise, aerospace capabilities and advanced research institutions are central to geopolitical and technological competition. As G7 members try to secure critical supply chains and reduce dependencies on potentially hostile states, Canada needs to think deeply about where its resources and technological capabilities fit within its network of trusted new partners.
Building Resilience Before Crisis Strikes
Canadians face forms of coercion at home that are similar to those experienced by the Taiwanese people, although at a very different scale: these include cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, economic pressure, disinformation, foreign interference and attempts to exploit political polarization.
In response to China’s constant threats, Taiwan has adopted a whole-of-society approach to democracy. During my visit, discussions repeatedly returned to civil preparedness, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure and the need for cooperation between government, the private sector and civil society. Taiwan is also focusing on vulnerabilities in satellite communications and undersea cables while investing in drone and dual-use technology capabilities. In August, Taiwan launched its annual Han Kuang military exercise designed to simulate more realistic wartime conditions. This year marked the largest-ever whole-of-society defence mobilization, involving not only emergency naval deployments and the relocation of a military arsenal but also the mobilization of civilian factories and deliberate slowdown of mobile internet speeds to simulate bandwidth shortages during war.
While Canada does not face the possibility of an invasion, resilience against cyberattacks, foreign interference, infrastructure disruption and disinformation are not unique to countries facing conventional military threats. In June 2026, Canada enacted Bill C-8 (An Act Respecting Cyber Security), making essential critical infrastructure and economic security core priorities, but resilience is no longer the responsibility of military or intelligence agencies alone. Universities, technology companies, infrastructure operators, local governments and citizens should also have roles to play.
Building Capacity and Diversifying Partnerships
Japan and South Korea are also adapting to a deteriorating regional security environment.
Japan, under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, has undertaken a significant transformation of its defence and security policies despite its long-standing postwar pacifist tradition. It is increasing defence spending, strengthening intelligence capabilities, and expanding cooperation with partners on cybersecurity, economic security and defence technology, including with Canada. In March 2026, the two countries established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership spanning defence, energy, critical minerals, trade, and technology, alongside agreements involving classified information and defence equipment.
South Korea, meanwhile, is strengthening its defence capabilities while investing heavily in strategic industries ranging from batteries and semiconductors to shipbuilding and defence manufacturing. This may partly reflect President Trump’s recent decision to scale back joint military exercises with Seoul. Canada’s growing security and defence relationship with South Korea, including the Canada-Republic of Korea Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership, now encompasses military cooperation; defence research and development; AI; cyber, space and hybrid threats; and critical infrastructure.
However, Canada’s decision to select Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) over South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean for its submarine procurement was a major defence decision, as South Korea had presented the program as the foundation for a wider partnership involving shipbuilding, defence manufacturing, technology and investment. By choosing TKMS, Canada may have relinquished an opportunity to deepen ties with one of the Indo-Pacific’s most important industrial and security partners and to diversify its partnerships.
Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies cybersecurity, critical minerals, energy, resilient supply chains and security as areas for deeper cooperation across the region but this recognition needs implementation.
While Canada has made some progress through individual partnerships, engagement with the Indo-Pacific still seems episodic. If Ottawa is serious about reducing its economic dependence on the United States and becoming more resilient in an era of geopolitical competition, engaging with and learning lessons from East Asia is essential.
What Canada Can Offer
Canada has significant critical-mineral reserves and energy resources; high-level AI research at its universities; aerospace and quantum expertise; and Arctic and maritime capabilities and ambitions, as well as access to Five Eyes intelligence networks. Meanwhile, East Asian partners bring strengths such as semiconductor ecosystems, advanced manufacturing, shipbuilding, battery production and defence technology, as well as extensive experience confronting cyberattacks, disinformation and other hybrid threats.
These distinct strengths provide the basis for a mutually reinforcing partnership: Canada can provide resources and research capabilities, while East Asian partners bring the industrial capacity and expertise needed to translate them into strategic technologies at a large scale. This cooperation could provide Canada with an opportunity to play a critical role in supply chains while giving partners in the region more secure and diversified sources of inputs. In the security realm, Canada would contribute its own experience while simultaneously learning from countries that have spent years adapting to economic coercion and grey-zone threats from their closest neighbour.
Countries such as Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have spent years building the resilience that Canada is only now recognizing it needs. They did so not of their own choosing, but because geography and geopolitics left them with no alternative. Canada still has time to learn from their experience, but that window is narrowing and the lessons will not wait.
