The Russian war against Ukraine has entered its twelfth year after the occupation of Crimea in February 2014, and it has come with an uncomfortable truth for the West: transatlantic security is no longer held together by shared values alone. It now rests on power — who has it, who produces it and who is willing to use it. On that measure, Canada and Europe remain dangerously dependent on the United States, while Ukraine — the continent’s most battle-tested military — continues to be treated as a subordinate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than as a member and equal partner.
If Europeans and Canadians want strategic parity with Washington, they must rearm — rapidly, visibly and at scale — and they should do so alongside Ukraine.
Russia’s military output tells the story. Between 2022 and 2024, Moscow launched roughly 12,000 missiles at Ukraine. In 2025 alone, it deployed more than 44,000 drones — a staggering 303 percent increase over the previous year. This is not a country preparing for peace, but rather a state that has reorganized its economy, industry and society around sustained war, while openly targeting civilian infrastructure.
Yet even as Russia escalates, Western unity is visibly fraying. The Trump administration’s renewed openness to Russia’s so-called “peace proposal” — one that would require Ukraine to cede territory and curtail its security partnerships — has intensified European doubts about US reliability. Recent statements questioning NATO commitments and signalling accommodation with Moscow have reinforced a growing fear in European capitals: that American guarantees are conditional, reversible and increasingly transactional.
The US decision to reduce its rotational troop presence in Romania, from roughly 1,700 personnel to about 1,000, has only amplified these concerns. Washington insists the move is temporary and that core capabilities remain intact. But for front-line states, symbolism matters. Forward-deployed US forces are not just military assets — they are political signals. Their partial withdrawal feeds a perception of disengagement, whether intended or not.
Europe’s eastern flank still hosts around 12,000 NATO troops, primarily in Poland and the Baltic states. Even so, Estonia’s president has warned that Europe must be prepared for a scenario in which US forces withdraw more substantially. Romania’s defence minister has openly urged Washington to reverse course. These are not signs of confidence; they are symptoms of dependence.
That dependence is structural. Europe has failed to replicate at scale and continues to rely heavily on American intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strategic enablers. Europe’s defence industry remains fragmented, slow and ill-suited for sustained high-intensity warfare.
This weakness is now intersecting with a deeply flawed diplomatic approach to Ukraine. The emerging “peace proposal,” discussed among Western and Russian interlocutors, has drawn skepticism from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, both of whom have emphasized that no viable settlement can exist without meaningful European — and Ukrainian — agency. Ukrainian officials, however, report that Kyiv was largely excluded from early discussions.
Making Ukraine Central to European Defence
That exclusion reveals the core problem. Ukraine is still not treated as a full political or military partner, despite bearing the costs of Europe’s largest war since 1945. Pressuring the victim of aggression to surrender territory while asking the aggressor for restraint is not diplomacy; it is strategic denial.
Even more troubling is the proposal’s demand to reduce Ukraine’s military. This would mean weakening what is, by any serious measure, the strongest army in Europe today — the only force on the continent with large-scale, modern combat experience against a peer adversary. Ukraine’s military is not a liability to European security; it is one of its greatest assets.
The resulting trust deficit is widening. European assistance has been substantial, with over €88 billion committed, but its aid is decreasing — for instance, Europeans delivered €4.24 billion to Ukraine in September-October 2025 versus €9.8 billion over May-June. US military aid to Ukraine has faced similar delays, with large portions still undelivered due to long production chains. Under the Biden administration, aid relied heavily on rapid drawdowns from US stockpiles alongside a long pipeline of future deliveries. The Trump administration has approved limited packages under a new mechanism in which NATO allies pay for weapons that are then sent to Ukraine, rather than the United States directly purchasing and transferring them itself. One such package approved in 2025 was for around $500 million in weapons, backed by allied financing.
Nearly all of the larger US aid figures available to Ukraine as of early 2025 were authorized under the Biden administration — for example, roughly $68 billion in military equipment and aid had been provided by the United States since Russia’s full-scale invasion up through early 2025.
Every delay translates into battlefield risk. Russia now produces ammunition at two to three times Europe’s monthly output and spends nearly seven percent of its GDP (roughly 161 billion USD) on defence and national security — triple pre-war levels. In turn, Europe has increased its defence spending since 2022 — reaching the record €343 billion in 2024. While high, it is unequally dispersed across 27 national systems, undermining interoperability and scale.
For example, Germany and France together account for around 44 percent of that sum. Furthermore, a substantial share of the budget is allocated to personnel, maintenance and research and development (R&D), rather than to joint equipment procurement. In addition, heavy reliance on US high-end technology means that much of Europe’s armaments are sourced from outside the continent. The European Union’s spending is also still 2.5 times less than that of the United States.
If Europe wants strategic autonomy — and credibility — it must stop confusing declarations with capability. Rearmament is not optional: it is the price of relevance.
Supporting Ukraine must also change in nature. Ukraine is not merely a recipient of aid; it is a source of military innovation. Ukrainian forces have transformed drone warfare, electronic countermeasures and AI-enabled targeting at a pace unmatched by any Western military. Some front-line units deploy dozens of drones daily — an operational experience that Europe simply does not possess.
The logical response is integration. Joint production lines, shared R&D, and co-manufacturing of drones, artillery and air-defence systems would expand output while embedding Ukraine directly into Europe’s defence-industrial base. This is not charity; it is force multiplication.
Canada has a clear stake in this shift. Ottawa has committed around 6.5 billion CAD in military assistance to Ukraine, but its greatest value lies ahead. Canada’s strengths in aerospace, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, drone technologies and critical minerals align directly with Ukraine’s battlefield innovations and Europe’s industrial gaps. A deeper Canada–Ukraine partnership would strengthen supply chains, accelerate technological diffusion and position Canada as a serious transatlantic security actor — not just a peripheral supporter.
Predictability is now as important as volume. Ukraine requires multi-year assistance frameworks instead of emergency funding cycles. Its projected $40 billion budget deficit in 2026 threatens not only military endurance but also societal resilience. Economic exhaustion is a strategic vulnerability that Moscow understands well.
The choice for the transatlantic community is clear: equality with the United States will not be given — it must be earned through real military capability, production and risk-sharing. Ukraine must be treated not as a beneficiary, but as a sovereign military power central to Europe’s defence.
This war is a test of whether the West will rebalance power and responsibility — or cling to old hierarchies. If Europe and Canada want a truly equal partnership, they must rearm now, fully integrate Ukraine and reduce dependence on the United States. Anything less guarantees a transatlantic order where Europe and Canada shoulder the risks of war without the power to shape peace.
