On January 7, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s office announced his upcoming visit to China to meet with the president of China, Xi Jingping, in what will be Canada’s first prime ministerial visit to China in nearly a decade. It’s not incidental that just two days before that, former Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien met Chinese Vice President Han Zheng in Beijing.
Chrétien is regarded in China as an “old friend of the Chinese people,” a designation reserved for elder foreign statesmen seen as having contributed to stable bilateral relations. Chinese officials continue to refer to Chrétien’s 1993–2003 tenure as the “golden decade” of Canada–China relations. His visit carried symbolic weight and sent a clear message ahead of Prime Minister Carney’s arrival: Beijing is prepared to stabilize relations and explore renewed economic engagement.
This reset is driven less by political symbolism than by economic realism. Both countries recognize that prolonged diplomatic paralysis serves neither country’s interests. In a fragmenting global economy, both sides are reassessing where cooperation remains viable, even as strategic mistrust persists.
Canada’s reassessment comes after seven years of strained relations following the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou and the detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. It also reflects a broader shift in Ottawa’s strategic environment. Carney’s visit signals a move away from the characterization of China as an “increasingly disruptive global power,” as framed in Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, toward a renewed understanding of China as a “strategic partner” in a changing world — an approach rooted in a framework established in 2005.
In an era of strategic rivalry and economic uncertainty, middle powers such as Canada cannot afford ideological rigidity or economic detachment.
External pressures have accelerated this shift — specifically, new tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, lumber and other products, and contentious Canadian-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) renegotiations. For a trade-dependent country like Canada, these underscore the risks of overconcentration — even with its closest ally — and reinforce the importance of diversification.
China, for its part, faces slowing growth, rising trade barriers in advanced economies and the need to stabilize relations with middle powers committed to rules-based trade. While repairing ties with Australia, Beijing has shown a clear interest in resetting relations with Canada, signalled by sustained diplomatic outreach from its new ambassador and senior officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
These converging strategic interests form the backdrop for Carney’s visit.
Economic complementarity remains the most durable pillar of the relationship. Energy and natural resources sit at the top of the list. China’s long-term demand for diversified and secure supplies aligns with Canada’s role as a reliable exporter of oil, liquefied natural gas, uranium and critical minerals. China has emerged as the leading destination for oil shipped through the expanded Trans Mountain pipeline since last spring, fitting squarely with the Carney government’s goals of positioning Canada as an energy superpower and doubling trade with partners beyond the United States.
Energy and critical minerals also provide Canada with leverage. As global supply chains become more politicized — and with uncertainty surrounding oil supplies from countries such as Venezuela — China has stronger incentives to diversify its sources. Canada, in turn, gains strategic flexibility in managing its relations with both Washington and Beijing.
Agriculture and agri-food form another cornerstone. China’s large and increasingly urban population continues to drive demand for high-quality, safe food products, an area where Canada has a strong reputation. There is also scope for cooperation in services and future-oriented sectors such as education, environmental technologies and climate-related solutions.
None of this suggests that a reset will be easy. Trade frictions remain acute, including Canada’s tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and China’s retaliatory measures on Canadian canola and other agricultural products. China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) poses another challenge: Canadian endorsement could imply a future free trade negotiation with a non-market economy and risk triggering CUSMA’s so-called poison pill clause.
Yet renewed engagement does not require lowering Canada’s guard. National security, human rights, foreign interference and non-market economic practices will remain central concerns. A sustainable reset depends on addressing these issues clearly and deliberately.
The task for Ottawa is not to choose between values and interests, but to balance them through policy design. Firm and transparent boundaries around sensitive technologies, data governance, critical infrastructure and security-related investments are essential. At the same time, Canada’s commitment to human rights, the rule of law and international norms remains compatible with economic engagement — particularly when anchored in multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the CPTPP.
For Carney’s visit, success should be measured modestly: restoring regular communication, clarifying areas of cooperation and competition, and preventing political disputes from automatically spilling over into trade and investment would all be wins.
In an era of strategic rivalry and economic uncertainty, middle powers such as Canada cannot afford ideological rigidity or economic detachment. Selective, disciplined engagement with China — without diluting values or compromising security — is not a contradiction. It is a mark of strategic maturity.
The lesson of past efforts, including the failed push for launching free trade negotiations during Justin Trudeau’s 2017 visit, is clear: values should inform Canada’s China policy, but not be mechanically fused to its economic agenda. Prime Minister Carney’s visit reflects a more sober understanding of that balance — and a recognition that strategic necessity, when paired with economic complementarity, can justify engagement without illusion.
