Reshaping Global Order: Xiangshan Forum Signals China’s Growing Soft Power

The Xiangshan Forum highlights China’s growing role in global security at a time when Western influence faces increasing constraints.

November 18, 2025
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Thailand's King Maha Vajiralongkorn and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People. (Tingshu Wang/REUTERS)

Until recently, analysts did not take the Beijing Xiangshan Forum (BXF) seriously, especially in comparison to its well-established rival, the Shangri-La Dialogue, with one analyst describing it as rather underwhelming. But in 2025, the situation is now completely different. The forum, in its twelfth iteration, is a barometer of changing times. China is increasingly gaining traction with states dissatisfied with the current global order. This year, the forum witnessed bolder rhetoric from senior guest officials, the participation of major figures from international institutions and record attendance.

As the future of the United States’ role in the international system becomes uncertain, China has seized the opportunity to fill a growing global power vacuum with leadership initiative. The momentum of this year’s summit points toward China’s mounting influence.

Once a minor event attracting a few dozen individuals, this year’s BXF summit welcomed over 1,800 guests from more than 100 countries and international organizations, including 40 defence ministers and military chiefs, as well as high-profile officials. This year’s attendance more than doubled overall participation since 2024 and represented a 30 percent increase in senior attendees. The 2025 forum was also indicative of Beijing’s declining relationship with Washington. China’s defence minister, Admiral Dong Jun (who delivered the opening speech), did not attend the recent Shangri-La Dialogue even though he and his predecessors had done so consistently since 2019. Meanwhile, the United States sent only the military attaché to its embassy in Beijing — a major downgrade from the deputy assistant secretary of defense who headed last year’s delegation.

As argued in a recent report (with co-authors Raphael Racicot and Adam P. MacDonald), the BXF has become a major tool for China to generate “soft power,” reshape the international order, promote its arms industry and encourage the People’s Liberation Army’s unique brand of military diplomacy. China does this by creating a multilateral environment in which it sets the agenda, dominates the narrative and capitalizes on its central role in orchestrating the proceedings.

In short, the BXF should no longer be ignored by the West. With its growing importance as a defining international defence forum, and as a manifestation of Beijing’s successful engagement of the Global South, the BXF exemplifies how Beijing is increasingly capable of building a network of like-minded states to incrementally reshape the international order.

China presents itself as “injecting reliable stability into a turbulent world,” promoting peace and the interests of the Global South.

Old Politics, New Vigour

Over the past few months, China’s foreign policy has been emboldened by the changes in US international behaviour with respect to trade and international institutions, as well as Iran, Russia and Venezuela, which have collectively aggravated some states and made the continuation of the existing rules-based international order less certain. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has both successfully pushed back against Washington’s aggressive tariff diplomacy and united with fellow autocracies in demonstrating alternative leadership options. Advocacy for building a “community for a shared future,” buttressed by China’s numerous global initiatives, is increasingly inspiring more disadvantaged countries to follow as China assumes a central role on the world stage and demonstrates consistency, stability and support to those nations willing to accept its lead.

In May 2025, the CCP released its first National Security White Paper, which included an entire section framing the international environment as one suffering from instability at the hands of the Americans, who have purportedly “disregarded their international responsibilities,” “broken contracts” and “withdrawn from core international organizations,” such as the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Meanwhile, China presents itself as “injecting reliable stability into a turbulent world,” promoting peace and the interests of the Global South.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s annual meeting in early September, Chinese President Xi Jinping described the world as increasingly “chaotic,” calling for the grouping’s members to oppose “Cold War mentality, camp confrontation, and bullying behavior.” Furthermore, he announced the Global Governance Initiative, a proposal to reform international governance that joins the ranks of similar initiatives under the umbrella of China’s plan for building a “community for a shared future.” Days later, speaking to 50,000 people and numerous world leaders in attendance for a massive military parade and pageantry in celebration of the eightieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Xi stated that China stands “firmly on the right side of history” as humanity finds itself “faced with the choice of peace or war.”

The themes of this year’s BXF continued to stress the unstable international context, the United States’ role in promoting chaos and China as an alternative guaranteeing a safer, more secure future. Under the banner of “Safeguarding the International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development Together,” the forum included presentations on the contributions of Chinese peacekeepers and humanitarian naval deployments globally. Dong’s speech also sought to portray China as a champion of multipolarity and denounced military alliances as having “selfish interests.” He reiterated the Global Governance Initiative, calling for states to strengthen the pillars of the international system and introduce much-needed reforms. In addition, Dong restated more bluntly than in previous years that China stood ready to intervene militarily to prevent Taiwan from gaining its independence.

This Time It’s Different

What makes this year’s summit different from previous iterations is the size and composition of the audience, the pointed speeches and the overall impression that the forum is establishing itself as a notable global event. It also gained significant international attention thanks to a video taken on its sidelines, which went viral, featuring a heated debate between renowned Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong and the Israeli military attaché to Beijing concerning the conflict in Gaza.

The forum has gained increased legitimacy given the notoriety of the attendees present. The vice president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, made remarks and gave a statement to Chinese state media, recognizing the event as key to building international dialogue. The secretary-general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations also delivered remarks and engaged with Chinese media, reiterating the grouping’s commitment to security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, voicing the bloc’s readiness to increase areas of security cooperation with Beijing and lauding the BXF for advancing shared goals. The UN under-secretary-general for peace operations, in remarks during a plenary session, recognized China’s financial and personnel contributions to peacekeeping, including a new 8,000-strong standby peacekeeping force.

The forum, as in previous years, permitted foreign dignitaries to have interactions with senior Chinese officials. Notably, the Nigerian defence minister met with China’s minister of equipment and development, to discuss defence technology transfers and strengthen Nigeria’s military industry. Moreover, guest states also publicly championed their meetings with one another, a common goal that explains why states send senior delegations to events like the Munich Conference or the Shangri-La Dialogue, again further reinforcing the BXF’s success in continuing to establish itself as a major venue of defence diplomacy. For instance, Cambodian and Malaysian officials discussed defence cooperation agreements in a one-on-one meeting, and Vietnam’s defence minister met with counterparts from Asia and Latin America.

What is most striking about this year’s event is the extent to which foreign states joined the bandwagon of Beijing’s rhetoric, while in previous years only Russia and Iran would have echoed Chinese messaging. The remarks by states other than China have shifted from measured and mostly neutral statements to outright criticism of the current state of the international order. Vietnam’s defence minister, for instance, openly criticized strategic competition as a risk to global security, borrowing Chinese wording in his denunciation of “hegemony, power supremacy, unilateralism [and] a Cold War mentality.” Singapore’s defence minister denounced high and unpredictable tariffs, highlighting that all states have a responsibility to positively contribute to building a better world. The defence minister of Myanmar additionally welcomed a “new world that rejects hegemony and eliminates global injustice.”

Open recognition of the purported virtues of the forum by foreign leaders was more public than before and was captured in both official and media sources of visiting delegations. Vietnam congratulated China for organizing a “leading platform” in security dialogue. Sri Lanka’s defence minister applauded the forum for promoting dialogue, quoting Xi on the importance of consultation and mutual understanding. Rwanda’s defence minister called China a “champion of peace and stability globally.”

The Future of the BXF

September's event showed the culmination of years of work by China to promote its own international security conference, distinct from Western models. Beijing has largely succeeded in building a self-sustaining diplomatic network of states that view it as a credible leader in world affairs, offering an alternative vision, values and counterpoint to the US-led international order.

In the current context, China’s success in eroding the existing rules-based international order and supplanting it with an alternative cannot be underestimated. The 2025 BXF clearly indicates that Beijing’s soft power is taking root. Looking ahead, the BXF will likely increasingly serve as a means of enhancing Beijing’s influence, offering states (particularly in the Global South) a venue for exchanging ideas, arms trading and deal making unencumbered by the norms of Western equivalents.

The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.

About the Authors

Raphael Racicot is a graduate student attached to the strategic joint staff at the Department of National Defence working for Defence Research and Development Canada.

Kurtis H. Simpson currently serves as a special advisor, Indo-Pacific affairs, within the Department of National Defence.