A Sovereign Advisory System for Canada: Rebuilding Strategic Foresight in Trade and Innovation

Canada’s once world-leading trade advisory system has been replaced with ad hoc consultations that lack continuity, confidentiality and technical rigour. This puts the country at a disadvantage compared to its peers, including the United States, where institutionalized advisory systems provide negotiators with structured, sectoral intelligence. Rebuilding a legislated sovereign advisory system that includes new sectoral advisory groups would restore foresight capacity and strengthen Canada’s negotiating position in the 2026 CUSMA review. Without such reform, Canada risks entering the renegotiations reactive and fragmented, while the United States advances with strategic depth and sectoral leverage.

Introduction: Canada’s Strategic Blind Spot

On September 19, 2025, Canada’s minister responsible for Canada-US trade, Dominic LeBlanc, announced the launch of public consultations on the upcoming Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) review, scheduled to conclude on November 3. This follows a parallel process initiated three days earlier by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), which will include a public hearing on November 17.

The CUSMA review will not only address tariffs and quotas but also rules governing data, digital services, artificial intelligence (AI), stablecoins and cloud sovereignty. For Canada, energy and critical minerals remain a foundation of prosperity, but trade policy has become inseparable from national security and technological sovereignty. Empires once built railways; now, they build algorithms.¹ Canada must decide whether to do more than leverage its natural wealth. It must determine whether it will serve only as a supplier of natural wealth or also as an architect of the emerging intangible economy.

From Advisory Groups to Silence

Canada once pioneered institutional innovation in trade advisory structures. In 1986, then-Minister of International Trade James Kelleher launched the Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade (SAGITs). This two-tiered system combined an apex International Trade Advisory Committee with 15 sectoral bodies covering agriculture, manufacturing, cultural industries and services. More than 300 business leaders and experts participated, providing crucial guidance during negotiations of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and subsequent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade–World Trade Organization (WTO) rounds.²

This machinery was dismantled over the past two decades, culminating under the Stephen Harper government, which replaced standing sectoral bodies with ad hoc consultations. Ottawa has since relied on episodic round tables, open calls for submissions and temporary advisory panels. While these approaches provide transparency and legitimacy, they lack the confidentiality, continuity and technical rigour available to negotiators in peer jurisdictions such as the United States, France and the European Union.

A 2025 op-ed from two Canadian public policy leaders in The Globe and Mail supported the return of sectoral advisory bodies within the panoply of Canadian policy options. Additionally, Former Canadian negotiators acknowledged that the absence of structured advisory systems during the CUSMA negotiations was frustrating, as Canadian teams faced counterparts equipped with confidential sectoral intelligence from the US Industry Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) framework.³ By contrast, Canada’s negotiators relied on broad public submissions and values-based input, which offered legitimacy but little technical depth. This asymmetry consistently left Canadian officials disadvantaged, not because of a lack of skill, but due to institutional design. In effect, Canadian negotiators arrived with fragmented notes, while American negotiators entered with sharpened strategies.

The erosion of Canada’s foresight capacity has created systemic vulnerabilities. Reliance on ad hoc consultations leaves critical voices — including Indigenous governments, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), labour and civil society — at a structural disadvantage compared to well-connected corporate actors. Without reform, Canada risks entering the 2026 CUSMA review without the strategic infrastructure necessary to defend its interests.

Dismantling of SAGITs

The Harper government, focused on streamlining government operations and cost-cutting, ended the SAGIT sectoral program by moving away from standing advisory bodies. While cost pressures and shifting priorities drove this, the effect has been the loss of Canada’s once world-leading foresight capacity, eliminating the dedicated capacity developed under the earlier two-tier structure. This policy shift was not announced publicly but rather is evident in the gradual cessation of formal sectoral advisory meetings, the disbanding of the International Trade Advisory Committee and its sectoral groups, and the absorption of some responsibilities into temporary panels or general round tables.

Since then, Ottawa has relied on episodic round tables, open calls for submissions and one-off advisory panels. Canada’s transparent consultation processes are important for legitimacy. However, they need to be complemented by confidential, technically specialized advisory structures that can provide negotiators with the depth of intelligence their counterparts already receive. Well-connected corporate actors and government insiders dominate, while Indigenous governments, SMEs, labour and civil society struggle to gain equal voice. In this system, lobbying capacity and money can result in outsized results, which raises other serious public policy concerns.

Canada does have occasional expert advisory bodies. For example, in January 2025, then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau named a Prime Minister’s Council on Canada-US Relations to provide advice on Canada-US trade. This was not a technical sectoral committee, but an overall ad hoc committee named by the prime minister. The Supply Chain Advisory Council in February 2025 is the latest example: narrow in scope, temporary in mandate and incapable of anchoring Canada’s broader trade strategy.

During CUSMA negotiations (2017–2020), the Government of Canada recorded more than 47,000 written submissions and held more than 1,300 stakeholder meetings. This was Canada’s most inclusive consultation in history, but inclusivity is not a strategy. Public submissions expressed broad values, rather than sector-specific guidance on negotiating text. US negotiators marched into talks with the full weight of the ITAC system. The US system equips its negotiators with structured, sectoral intelligence. Canada’s negotiators, by contrast, rely on more open consultations that do not provide the same depth of technical insight. As a result, Canadian negotiators are often at a disadvantage — not because of a lack of talent, but due to institutional design. Canada’s recent approach has not been structured, confidential, or built to take technically rigorous advice, unlike that which is available to sharpen every American draft.

Canada legitimized its positions through public outreach. The United States fortified its positions through institutionalized intelligence. This asymmetry meant US negotiators consistently entered with more substantial leverage.

CUSMA’s Review and Termination Provisions

CUSMA is not permanent; it is conditional. Article 34.7 establishes a 16-year term, with a review in year six (2026). If all three parties agree, the agreement extends another 16 years. If even one party hesitates, reviews occur annually until consensus is reached. Article 34.6 allows any party to withdraw with six months’ notice, leaving the agreement in force only between the remaining two.

The consequences of termination would be severe. WTO tariffs would reappear overnight. Canadian auto exports would lose preferential rules of origin, agriculture would face tariff spikes and rules for critical minerals would lapse. Supply chains would be destabilized within half a year. This underlines the urgency for Canada to reconstitute its foresight infrastructure before entering the 2026 review.

International Comparisons: How Others Do It

To understand Canada’s institutional weakness, one must examine the advisory systems of its peers.

United States

The United States operates the most institutionalized advisory framework. Congress created the ITAC system in 1974. Today, it comprises 15 sectoral ITACs, six Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees (ATACs) and the apex Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN). Members, appointed by the president or jointly by the USTR and the secretary of commerce, gain access to negotiating texts and provide confidential reports before Congress considers agreements.

This system gives US negotiators continuous access to sectoral intelligence and ensures Congress benefits from structured advice. It fosters trust, continuity and credibility across administrations. Between 700 and 1,000 persons participate in the ITAC and trade advisory committee system, making it a durable engine of strategic foresight. By contrast, Canada sends negotiators equipped with fragmented consultations rather than sectoral analysis.

The system offers profound advantages:

• It institutionalizes trust between negotiators and stakeholders by granting members access to draft texts under strict confidentiality agreements.
• It ensures negotiators are informed by real-time industry expertise across sectors, from automotive to semiconductors to intellectual property (IP).
• It also provides Congress with written reports that enhance transparency and accountability, embedding domestic legitimacy into US trade policy.

Above all, the system creates continuity: advisory committees endure across administrations, ensuring that US negotiators arrive at the table backed by a unified and credible domestic machine.

France

France operates the Conseillers du commerce extérieur de la France (CCEs), a network of more than 4,500 advisors across 150 countries. With 120 years of institutional history, the CCEs combine commercial diplomacy with advisory functions. Appointed by decree of the prime minister, they advise the government, assist SMEs, train young people and promote France’s attractiveness for investment. The CCEs illustrate the power of embedding trade advisory functions into both domestic and global networks.

European Union

The European Union employs Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) under each free trade agreement, beginning with the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2011. These groups balance business, union and non-governmental organization perspectives, meet regularly and participate in joint civil society forums with partner countries. They are integrated into the European Union’s sustainable development framework, embedding inclusivity into trade governance.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom briefly operated a Strategic Trade Advisory Group following Brexit, replaced by the Industrial Strategy Advisory Council (ISAC). ISAC provides quarterly advice to the chancellor and the secretary of state for business and trade, though it lacks the trade-specific focus of ITAC-style systems.

Australia

Australia has begun piloting advisory groups and considering statutory legislation to create a permanent system modelled on ITAC. It is moving forward at a time when Canada risks sliding further backward.

Rebuilding a Canadian Sovereign Advisory System

Canada requires a durable, legislated system capable of supporting negotiators in the digital age. A proposed model would combine a Canadian Trade and Economic Security Council (CTESC) with a new generation of sectoral advisory groups (See Annex 1). The CTESC would integrate trade, defence, resilience and security. Sectoral groups would provide intelligence across strategic areas such as digital and AI, critical minerals, autos, aerospace, cultural industries and services.

Appointments should be made by the Governor in Council, on the advice of the minister of international trade, with balanced representation from Canadian-owned firms, provinces, Indigenous governments, labour and civil society. Members should sign confidentiality agreements allowing access to draft texts. This would mirror the US ITAC model while reflecting Canadian federalism and pluralism.

The system should operate on a permanent basis, with monthly sectoral meetings, quarterly plenaries and surge working groups during live negotiations. To ensure transparency, non-confidential digests should be published. To guarantee durability, the system must be legislated, not discretionary.

CUSMA 2.0

Canada faces unique challenges and opportunities as it prepares for the complex renegotiation of CUSMA. Critical asymmetries exist in both government resourcing for trade talks and institutional consultation mechanisms when compared to the United States, particularly in the areas of the digital economy, AI and cloud-based commerce.

Asymmetry in Resources and Consultative Infrastructure

Canada’s trade team is comparatively smaller and less specialized than the USTR’s dedicated staff and extensive network of standing advisory committees — modelled most prominently through the US ITAC. Over multiple decades, the ITAC structure has enabled the United States to mobilize in-depth sector expertise, technical feedback and direct line access to policy makers on all aspects of trade negotiations, including emerging technologies and digital trade. Canada, in contrast, relies on ad hoc consultations and broader public engagement, limiting access to confidential technical advice and sectoral intelligence at speed and scale.

Absence of Formal ITAC-Style Structures

While Canada’s open consultation approach delivers transparency and diverse stakeholder input, the absence of a formal mechanism like ITAC means Canadian negotiators lack routine, structured and ongoing engagement with knowledgeable representatives of the digital economy, critical industries and innovation sectors. This can result in slower responses, fragmented input and gaps in practical knowledge — especially on complex verticals such as AI, data governance, online platforms, digital finance and cross-border cloud infrastructure.

Timeliness and Quality of Disclosure

US consultations are tightly scheduled to meet statutory requirements. The USTR publishes Federal Register notices, sets deadlines and convenes technical hearings months before negotiations commence. Members of ITACs are provided with technical briefings, impact assessments and restricted access to negotiating positions, allowing for iterative sectoral feedback and timely problem-solving.

Canadian processes, while consultative, tend to lag behind US timelines and offer less disclosure to consulted experts, potentially leaving critical gaps in negotiation preparedness concerning rapidly evolving topics such as digital services and AI oversight.

Implications for Digital Economy, AI and Cloud Negotiations

Upcoming CUSMA renegotiations will inevitably focus on knowledge-intensive domains:

• digital trade provisions (cross-border data flows, privacy, regulatory alignment);
• standards for AI, including ethical guidelines and IP protections;
• cybersecurity, digital taxation and competition policy; and
• cloud infrastructure, localization and jurisdictional issues.

Without a formalized consultative framework, Canada’s ability to rapidly mobilize specialized expertise — and to mirror the United States’ deep engagement with sectoral leaders — will be constrained. Meanwhile, the United States will likely advance heavily detailed proposals shaped by a well-briefed cohort of ITAC members and technical working groups. This asymmetry will place considerable pressure on Canadian negotiators to catch up, particularly where sector knowledge is essential for balanced, innovative and future-proof commitments.

The Case for Institutional Foresight

The United States will enter CUSMA 2.0 armed with statutory intelligence. Canada will enter with public submissions. That is the asymmetry. Canada must bridge it.

Canada need not replicate the US ITAC wholesale, but it can learn from its durability and technical focus, just as France demonstrates the power of global networks, and the European Union shows how to balance trade with sustainability.

The CUSMA review collides with two structural challenges: geopolitical trade shocks and the governance of emerging technologies. Both demand real-time, sector-specific intelligence. Canada requires a permanent system and should take the following steps:

• Re-establish sectoral advisory groups covering critical domains from agriculture and automotive to AI, data governance, sovereign cloud and digital finance. They should be empowered to give confidential, text-ready advice to negotiators.
• Invest in expanded training of trade policy staff specializing in digital economy issues. The focus should be on capacity building and whole-of-government approaches from trusted external sources as soon as possible.
• Synchronize consultation timelines to align with US statutory processes, ensuring Canadian input is both timely and actionable.
• Create a CTESC, an apex advisory body with cross-sectoral and cross-government authority. It must endure political cycles.
• Build a security and resilience panel and ensure dual-use risks — critical minerals, semiconductors and cybersecurity — are integrated into trade policy. The panel should be embedded cross-departmentally (Department of National Defence [DND], Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada [ISED], Natural Resources Canada [NRCan], Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS], Communications Security Establishment [CSE]).
• Institutionalize rotations. Follow French and EU best practices by embedding rotations between government, business, academia, Indigenous governments and civil society. Knowledge must circulate to remain sovereign.

Rotations represent a best practice in France and the European Union. French CCEs often include private sector executives with extensive overseas experience, whereas the European Union’s DAGs integrate civil society organizations directly into trade governance. Canada should design a system that ensures officials rotate through industry and academic sectors, and vice versa, thereby blending insider expertise with democratic legitimacy.

These measures will enhance Canada’s readiness for the upcoming review and equip policy makers with the insights, agility and negotiation leverage necessary to secure the national interest in the next generation of North American trade.

Next Steps: Building Canada’s Sovereign Advisory System

To ensure Canada enters the CUSMA 2026 review with foresight and leverage, reforms must proceed in three phases:

Phase 1: Immediate (2025–2026)

• Pilot advisory groups in high-priority domains: digital economy, AI, critical minerals and cloud sovereignty.
• Align Canadian consultation timelines with US statutory processes to ensure simultaneous preparation.
• Begin technical training for trade policy staff on digital and algorithmic issues.

Phase 2: Medium Term (2026)

• Create SAGITs 2.0, covering agriculture, manufacturing, energy and emerging technologies.
• Establish the CTESC as a permanent apex body with cross-sectoral representation.
• Formalize a Security and Resilience Panel integrating DND, ISED, NRCan, CSIS, and CSE into trade strategy.

Phase 3: Long Term (2027 onward)

• Institutionalize rotations between government, industry, academia, Indigenous governments and civil society to circulate expertise.
• Expand Canada’s global advisory networks, drawing lessons from France’s CCEs and the European Union’s DAGs.
• Embed the advisory system into Canada’s long-term trade governance framework to ensure continuity across political cycles.

Implications for Canada

Without reform, Canada risks entering the 2026 CUSMA review unprepared. Structured, sectoral advisory systems are not bureaucratic luxuries; they are sovereign necessities. The United States, France, the European Union and even Australia have recognized that trade negotiations require confidential, continuous and technically rigorous intelligence. Canada has dismantled the very system it once pioneered.

The asymmetry is stark. US negotiators will arrive armed with ITAC intelligence: sector-specific expertise, confidential briefings and detailed reports vetted by industry, civil society and labour stakeholders. These insights give Washington leverage to anticipate Canadian positions, craft precise counter-demands and justify its stances domestically. Ottawa, by contrast, risks walking in with only public submissions: broad statements of principle gathered through consultations that, while inclusive, are ill-suited to the tactical demands of line-by-line treaty negotiation. One side will have a scalpel, the other, a blunt instrument.

Public consultations are not enough. They provide transparency, not strategy. They legitimize positions, but they do not equip negotiators to defend them.

Reconstituting a sovereign advisory system would restore foresight capacity, strengthen Canada’s negotiating hand and ensure that critical voices beyond corporate insiders shape national trade strategy. In an era when algorithms define power and six months can determine an economy’s fate, Canada cannot afford improvisation. Strategic foresight must once again be the anchor of Canada’s trade policy. Anything less would leave Canada reactive, fragmented and vulnerable at the very moment when foresight is most needed.